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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Norman·P. Effman, Esq. 
Wyoming Co.-Attica Legal Aid 
18 Linwood Avenue 
Warsaw, New York 14569 
Decision appealed: October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s) Smith, Cruse, Demosthenes 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived February 26, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notic~ (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
--~tt--~d _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ ModUied to ___ _ 
~rmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to - ---
~V:mrmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
,commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ e fi 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, oo __,,,.l'.J!-"'-1);!::...;,~:..;i· ~'---5"'..E'-. 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (1112018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Hendricks, Kareem DIN: 14-A-5429
Facility: Wyoming CF AC No.: 10-200-18 B
Findings: (Page 1 of 3)
Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary, 
capricious and irrational, made in violation of applicable legal authority, and relied too heavily 
upon the serious nature of Appellant’s crimes of conviction; (2) the Board did not provide 
sufficient weight to Appellant’s receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate (EEC), programming, 
positive accomplishments, rehabilitative efforts, letters of support, certain COMPAS scores, and 
release plans were not given sufficient consideration by the Board; (3) the Board failed to consider 
a Transitional Accountability Plan (TAP) for Appellant; (4) certain issues were not discussed 
during the interview; (5) the Board’s decision was made in violation of Appellant’s due process 
rights; and (6) Appellant’s age at the time of commission of the crimes of conviction was not 
properly addressed during the interview. 
As to the first two issues, Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider 
criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s 
institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is 
mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 
95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is 
solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 
997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board 
did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter 
of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of 
McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); 
Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 
(3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128. 
Appellant’s receipt of an EEC does not automatically guarantee his release, and it does not 
eliminate consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Milling v. 
Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 
822 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2006); Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d 
Dept. 2006); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Hendricks, Kareem DIN: 14-A-5429
Facility: Wyoming CF AC No.: 10-200-18 B
Findings: (Page 2 of 3)
775, 776 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001).  Where an inmate 
has been awarded an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society.  
Correction Law §805; Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 
A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 
1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 
(1992). The standard set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) requiring consideration of whether 
the inmate’s release will so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law 
does not apply in cases where an EEC has been awarded.   
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the applicable substantive standards that the Board 
is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with applicable statutory factors. See 
Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 
2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); 
see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  
Furthermore, declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 
amendments.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
As to the third issue, Correction Law 71-a requires DOCCS to prepare a Transitional 
Accountably Plan (TAP).  The name of the Transitional Accountability Plan was changed to 
“Offender Case Plan”, which is prepared for inmates in the Department’s custody based on their 
programming and treatment needs.  In making parole release decisions, the Board must consider 
the most current case plan that may have been prepared by DOCCS. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(b).  An 
Offender Case Plan was prepared for Appellant and made available to the Board at the time of the 
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interview. See also Matter of Alymer v. New York State Bd. of Parole, Index No. 218-16, Decision 
& Order dated Dec. 13, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (McGrath J.S.C.) (inmate’s case plan met 
requirement of TAP in accordance with Correction Law 71-a). 
As to the fourth issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
As to the fifth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on 
parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 
50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 
N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a 
possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due 
process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).   
As to the sixth issue, pursuant to the court’s holding in the Hawkins case, for those inmates 
who are serving a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a crime committed prior to attaining 
the age of 18, “the Board must consider youth and its attendant circumstances in relationship to 
the commission of the crime at issue.” See, Hawkins v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. 
Supervision, 140 A.D.3d 34 (3d Dept. 2016), affirming in relevant part, 51 Misc. 3d 1218(A) (Sup. 
Ct., Sullivan Co., 2015).  The mandates set forth in the Hawkins case do not apply because Appellant 
is not serving a life sentence. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
